Four years ago, I wrote a blog post about the book Austin’s Way with Skepticism, by Indiana University philosopher Mark Kaplan. You can read it here. However, more broadly, the post was about a certain time in my life. It was about the time I spent at IU in Bloomington, Indiana.
As I worked my way through an undergrad philosophy degree, I liked an approach known as ‘ordinary language philosophy.’ Among other points, I particularly liked the idea that our ordinary position gives us a point of departure for philosophizing. That is to say, given our ordinary position as a starting point, we should be able to reach a philosophical term or viewpoint. Otherwise, we set it aside.
In short, Kaplan interprets the ordinary language philosopher J.L. Austin skillfully. But I thought he missed a broader point in Austin’s work, specifically, and certain kinds of ordinary language philosophy, generally. The point is that we have to understand the communicative functions of our words, even philosophical words like ‘know.’
With that in mind, I turn to the book How to Take Skepticism Seriously. It’s written by Adam Leite, another IU philosopher and my undergrad thesis adviser from 20 years ago. In it, he summarizes much of the epistemological work of his own philosophical career.
