‘Radlib’? What’s that?
Let’s start here. Leftists turn to insults and name calling every now and then. And we have no shortage of names to call the people who disagree with us. We can (and do) call them ‘liberal.’ For the edgier among them, we can call them ‘ultra-liberal‘ (or even ‘ultra-left‘ if they’re leftists we don’t like). Or if we’re just feeling like pouring gas on a fire, we can use ‘shitlib.’
But I’m interested in ‘radlib.’ Let’s take a look at it. What might be compelling about it? Can it do any work those other terms can’t?
The Term ‘Radlib’
I think the term has a lot of potential. For one, it describes a lot of what I see in political discourse. It also allows us to identify a few issues. At least, it does these things when properly understood. And that’s the kicker, really. It takes some work to get to that proper understanding.
Hopefully I can do a bit of that work here.
Two Definitions of ‘Radlib’
Nobody likes a philosopher who starts by citing the dictionary. I saw a big name do that at a keynote lecture once. It’s bad form.
But I’m going to cite urban dictionary. I think I can get away with that just this once. Partly due to the few decent attempts to get at the term. Urban dictionary provides us with two definitions. Here they are:
1. Short for Radical Liberal. Used as an insult among leftist groups for people who claim to be radicals or leftists, often to feel good about themselves, but express liberal, uninformed or otherwise non-leftist views about important topics such as capitalism, reformism vs revolution, lgbtq+ rights, gender politics, or sometimes just people who support Joe Biden.
2. A bourgeois person who identifies himself as a ‘radical centrist,’ one who shuns political principles or ideology in favor of seeking common ground with the radical right (fascists), their natural class allies.
Bad Elements of the Definitions
I’ll start by taking out the things I don’t like.
The first one’s pretty good, so I won’t take out much. The only part that doesn’t work is the “…sometimes just people who support Joe Biden” part at the end. That doesn’t work at all. Most radlibs do support Joe Biden. And Democrats running for office in general. But that fact alone can’t make them a radlib. In fact, most Joe Biden supporters (and Democrats in general) aren’t radlibs. Most are just regular liberals, moderates, or ‘never Trump’ people.
The second one goes much further astray. The point about being a ‘radical centrist’ is an important one, but it doesn’t matter whether the person “identifies himself” as one. If anything, it’s quite the opposite: the person ‘identifies’ as a radical, progressive, or leftist, but is, in fact, a ‘radical centrist.’ And the points about a bourgeois person seeking common ground with the radical right (their ‘natural class allies’) is totally irrelevant. Some radlibs do all this, but these behaviors aren’t essential to being a radlib. Many radlibs are well off, but their class status isn’t an essential part of the term.
So, yeah. These things have no place at all in the definition of the term. Only in examples of it.
Good Elements of the Definitions
So, that’s what’s wrong with the definitions found above. Let’s talk about what’s right about them.
I think the first definition mostly hits the mark. It gets at the key insight of the term: a radlib is a person who uses leftist or radical language or forms in order to defend non-leftist, non-radical views.
The second definition, again, fares worse, though it does get at the point that many radlibs approach politics from a perspective that we might call ‘radical centrism.’ In their recent study of working-class voters, Jacobin refers to this perspective as ‘woke centrism.’ They attribute it to politicians like Kamala Harris and Kirsten Gillibrand. More on that in a bit.
That’s a key insight within an otherwise bad definition.
A Definition of ‘Radlib’
Here’s my attempt at providing a definition:
A radlib is someone who uses radical or leftist language to advance or defend non-radical, non-leftist ideas, usually ideas that don’t differ in any significant way from ideas already found in mainstream US politics.
And, of course, the related adjective would be an idea of the sort that radlibs advocate, i.e., an idea that appears radical or leftist but, in fact, isn’t radical or leftist.
The key part here – the part that’s often missing from other definitions – is that there’s a relation between the radical language and the non-radical views. A radlib isn’t just a non-radical who claims to be one. They’re non-radicals who put radical language into the service of non-radical views!
It’s not a perfect definition. I find it fuzzy how an idea differs in a ‘significant way.’ But that probably comes to a way that puts power in the hands of working-class people and/or members of other marginalized groups. However, it provides a good starting point and captures what’s useful about the term.
I find ‘radlib’ to be related – but not identical – to other notions I’ve discussed on this blog. Notions like ‘woke HR‘ and ‘elevator words.’ But unlike woke HR, it’s about defending bad policies, not about making money. And, at best, it’s one specific case of the use of elevator words, not the full phenomenon.
Examples
Let’s take a look at a few examples, starting with the adjective form. For one radlib idea, consider the reparations program in Evanston, Illinois. In effect, Evanston passed a fairly standard, narrowly targeted housing program. But they slapped the label ‘reparations’ on it. Why? Probably because the program targets race instead of income.
Is it a good idea? Maybe. We have better ideas out there. Is it a radical idea? No. Is it a leftist idea? No. Does it differ in a significant way from mainstream political ideas? No. Is it even really reparations? Probably not, depending on your definition. By contrast, we have actual leftist versions of reparations out there. Those versions go beyond mere radical language and get at radical policy. I wrote about that in another post.
For radlib people, consider politicians like Kirsten Gillibrand or pundits and NGO staffers like Charlotte Clymer. Both toss around radical language like it’s going out of style. Gillibrand centers her language on gender and t-shirts, while Clymer centers hers on obnoxious Twitter trolling. Both often personify the second urban dictionary example, where the idea is that they use seemingly radical language to block anything that really challenges the basic structure of power in society.
Finally, in certain forms, UBI qualifies as a radlib idea. Especially when its advocates make all sorts of baseless claims about how it will ‘strengthen the working class’ and do various other things it wouldn’t actually do in practice.
The Impact – Why Does It Matter?
In the end, why does any of this matter? Is it important to figure out who’s a radlib, and why they’re one? Here’s at least one reason to care: radlib politicians and ideas almost always turn out unpopular or unsuccessful.
We can see this clearly in the case of a Gillibrand or a Clymer. Gillibrand’s presidential campaign went nowhere. And even her own staffers called her campaign ‘performative and obnoxious’ by the end. Clymer’s advocacy looks much the same. She often bangs the drum for radical sounding ideas that aren’t very popular. Or radical sounding politicians who aren’t very popular.
In a place like Evanston, maybe an idea gets by here and there. But that’s because the idea doesn’t challenge the structure of power. Rather, it allows politicians to claim ‘radical’ cred without doing anything radical. These things work only in specific sorts of liberal bubbles. As Jacobin points out in the study I linked above, none of this plays well with anyone else. Especially the working-class and marginalized people the left needs in order to change anything.
And so, radlib ideas often end up as the worst of both worlds: not only are they not really leftist, they’re also largely unpopular and unsuccessful. Why wouldn’t a leftist want to avoid ideas like that?
